Experts warn that election manipulations begin one to two years in advance, and as the elections approach, FIMI and DIMI intensify, which requires a timely and coordinated institutional response. 

Elections are one of the most sensitive periods when it comes to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIM). This does not happen overnight and it is not only confined to election day, but begins much earlier, a year or two before the elections. 

The next regular election cycle for North Macedonia is about two years from now, in 2028. Therefore, right now is the moment when the country should start dealing with this challenge, according to the independent expert and consultant on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference, Federico Giulio Sicurella, who also referenced a European Union report on the manipulation of information during elections. 

“What the report contains is a key point, and that is that manipulation does not happen on election day itself. In fact, most of the manipulation related to elections starts long before that, a year or a year and a half before the elections start. So today is the moment to start. This is the time when the so-called influence assets are established that will intensify as the elections approach. That is an important lesson,” Sicurella said. 

He also pointed out that it is important to monitor what happens after the elections because hostile actors, if any, are interested in seeing what the impact and effect of the level of action was. 

Sicurella shared his views during the “Readiness of the Institutions to Respond to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI): Challenges, Coordination and Next Steps” event organized by the Institute of Communication Studies on April 8 in Skopje. 

Speaking about the importance of countering information manipulation, OSCE/ODIHR Media Monitoring Specialist Franceska Boggeri pointed out that cooperation and involvement of other institutions, cooperation with civil society organizations, etc. are needed. This is because, among other things, as she pointed out, the OSCE/ODIHR mission that monitors the election cycles in North Macedonia is in the country for a limited period of a few weeks. Cooperation, she emphasizes, is paramount. 

“The biggest risk for Macedonia is fragmentation. That’s exactly what we’re noticing – there is capacity at all levels, but what is lacking is to it to be unified, to bring in the appropriate expertise, to avoid overlapping,” Boggeri stated. 

Foreign and domestic manipulation go hand in hand 

Both Boggeri and Sicurella were clear – Foreign and Domestic Information Manipulation and Interference go hand in hand. Domestic Information Manipulation and Interference (DIMI), as Boggeri underscored, is the focus of election observation missions and that is their mandate, but she highlighted that they are always linked to foreign actors. 

“What is the difference between DIMI and FIMI analysis? FIMI requires attribution. An election observation organization does not do attribution; it is not the role and the mandate of election observation missions. But of course, it depends on the context. There will be introduced a qualitative element of FIMI, if necessary, obviously. But the core focus is domestic information manipulation, on which we agree, there is no FIMI without DIMI, so these domestic malign actors are always connected with the foreign actors. But to understand and to evaluate this connection is not always easy, it requires specific skills, which often the analysts who work in election observation missions do not have – forensic experience, for instance, and other similar types of experience. It’s complex.” Boggeri pointed out. 

Any campaign against Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference will be unsuccessful if it does not mobilize domestic forces, such as influencers, and does not initiate narratives important to the domestic public, hot-button questions, and divisive topics. 

“FIMI actors are known to use these local connections, but also to obfuscate, to conceal those connections so that they can gain plausible deniability. So, my point is, when we pursue institutionalisation of FIMI approaches we should keep that into account. DIMI is important. Of course, the challenge is how to design institutions so that they can deal with FIMI and DIMI at the same time, and this raises, of course, important questions about mandate, institutional competencies and responsibilities,” independent expert Sicurella stated. 

Macedonia plans to institutionalize the fight against FIMI 

But where does North Macedonia stand in dealing with these challenges? Government representatives claim that they are aware of the seriousness of these issues and have already taken steps. Government spokesperson Marija Miteva said that they have the political will to open the discussion on how to proceed. As she pointed out, the fact is that this is one of the most subtle threats today, because it is not a physical attack, but an attack through narratives that can significantly undermine trust in institutions. What has been done institutionally, Miteva emphasized, is the National Cybersecurity Strategy, which detects hybrid threats and paves the way for additional legislative frameworks. 

Furthermore, an informal working group was formed with representatives of several institutions and they have begun working on this topic. 

“The key thing for us, we wanted to see how much Macedonian institutions truly understand the meaning of this topic, whether we can make the distinction between disinformation and fake news, or whether we really know what this new phenomenon means, to which we must seriously respond. The next step would be to perhaps institutionalize this entire thing, that is, establish a coordinating body that will effectively monitor everything and will be able to stay up to date with the situation,” Miteva said.

There is no ideal model, as was underlined by both Miteva and the experts. A model for dealing with FIMI is needed that takes into account the Macedonian context. However, there are several successful examples across Europe whose experiences can be used. 

Some of them, also pointed out by the independent expert and consultant Cicurella, are the models in Sweden, which has established Psychological Defence Agency, the French service for vigilance and protection against foreign digital interference – VIGINUM, the Ukrainian Centre for Countering Disinformation… 

There is also the British model, where the authorities have established the RESIST system. As Joe McCarron-Shipman from the UK Government Communications Service (GCS) points out, it is a system that consists of several components, namely threat recognition, an early warning system, situational insight, strategic communications and performance monitoring. 

Among the key questions that need to be asked in order for a system to effectively respond to disinformation campaigns and fake news is to see who is spreading the information, whether those people are working for a foreign country, whether a PR firm is involved, who is paying for the campaign, and what these actors are capable of doing. 

However, Shipman emphasized that tackling FIMI is resource-intensive, not just requiring funds, but also a lot of training, skills, and human intelligence. The point, ultimately, is to disrupt the profitability of these actors. 

“FIMI actors essentially run like organised crime. They are shadowy. They don’t adhere to certain borders and they often can quickly adapt their approach to change where they are located, but also the laws they are sitting within. So, by working together, we can, number one, share the burden of the analytical resource issues, but, also, we can give them less places to hide. And this is one thing we are really keen on in the UK – is ensuring that we are working as much with our partners to restrict the ability for these people to hide in certain places online and in person. And, essentially, that collaboration will stop FIMI being profitable. It won’t stop FIMI overnight, but what it will do is make it harder for the actual foreign government to do a successful campaign,” says Shipman. 

Are there any foreign actors in North Macedonia? 

The debate on the fight against Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference and the search for an ideal model for dealing with it has also raised the question of whether there is FIMI in North Macedonia and to what extent. 

Representatives of the political parties who attended the debate agreed that a response to such threats is needed, but they have different views on where foreign interference is coming from. 

SDSM’s Secretary for International Cooperation, Andrej Zernovski, accused the VMRO-DPMNE-led government of direct possession of Macedonian media, aided by Hungarian capital, alluding to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who in the meantime lost the elections and will be the opposition after his 16 years of rule. 

“We live in a country where over 40 percent of the media space is controlled by media outlets that are under Orban’s control,” Zernovski said, citing specific examples. He claimed that such media outlets spread narratives that the European Union is erasing our identity, anti-EU messages, and subtle pro-Russian messages. 

“The question arises whether our institutions do not have the capacity, cannot or do not want to react. I fear that the latter is the case. We must create a single body that will coordinate the work between the Ministry of Interior, the Intelligence Agency, the Agency for Electronic Communications, and so on. Because, at this moment, they all act in a fragmented manner. In the previous government, we also acted in a fragmented manner, don’t get me wrong. However, when you have such a presence of another country in the media, we are without a doubt exposed to influences,” Zernovski said. 

He pointed out that in North Macedonia there is no report on foreign interference and manipulation by the competent bodies, nor an early warning system for coordinated foreign campaigns. 

Brane Petrushevski, MP from the ruling VMRO-DPMNE, rejected the opposition’s accusations that there is foreign interference in North Macedonia. According to him, the opposition is actually a domestic source for information manipulation, calling out the opposition for manipulating information about bringing in migrants that were initially rejected by the United Kingdom, information that was refuted. 

“If we look at this through the lens and in the framework of what was presented here, we will see that if we follow these steps to recognize foreign information interference, we will answer the questions: are they amplifying the narrative – yes, they do that every day on a certain topic; are they inciting divisions – they absolutely incite divisions in society; and are they trying to create chaos – yes, they are trying to create chaos. So, I will take this statement by the opposition through the prism of a classic blatant example of domestic information manipulation,” Petrushevski said. 

The National Coordinator for Preventing Violent Extremism and Countering Terrorism, Pavle Trajanov, claimed that it cannot be said that the country does not have any system in place. He pointed to the existence of the National Committee for Preventing Violent Extremism and Terrorism, in which 22 institutions participate, and claimed that this body coordinates activities on these situations, including foreign influence. 

“In general, the security, intelligence, and counterintelligence services, the Ministry of Interior, but also military intelligence services monitor all situations more broadly, including foreign interference. So, it’s not that there is no system that is well-established and functioning. Regarding whether there is foreign interference, as the opposition pointed out, I don’t think there is any Russian interference in the politics of the Republic of North Macedonia. That is classic manipulation or an attempt to discredit or rather block Macedonia’s European path,” Trajanov said. 

The roundtable “Readiness of the Institutions to Respond to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI): Challenges, Coordination and Next Steps” was organized within the framework of the “Strengthening the operational readiness of the Government to respond to FIMI in North Macedonia” project, supported by the British Embassy in Skopje. 

As part of the activities in this project, ICS is preparing an analysis of institutional preparedness and capacity in North Macedonia, as well as models and approaches for institutional response to various information manipulation operations. 

Content produced by the Institute of Communication Studies. 

Journalist: Aleksandar Samardziski 

Camera operator: Ivan Popovic 

Photography: Tomislav Georgiev 

Editing: Risto Dushkovski