Foreign interference and manipulation with information (FIMI) does not happen on the actual election day, but much earlier – a year or two before the elections. Therefore, monitoring this issue should begin today, and this is the moment when the so-called influence assets are established.

This is one of the conclusions of the roundtable organized today on “Readiness of the institutions to respond to foreign interference and manipulation of information (FIMI): challenges, coordination and next steps” organized by the Institute of Communication Studies.

The purpose of the debate was to open a discussion on the most appropriate institutionally coordinated response to deal with such malicious foreign influences.

The independent expert and consultant on foreign interference and manipulation of information, Federico Giulio Cicurella, pointed out that FIMI cannot exist without DIMI – domestic interference and manipulation of information, and therefore, in dealing with this challenge, the involvement of domestic stakeholders is also necessary.

“FIMI factors lack the sophistication to fit into the domestic context, in order to make the action even more successful. The point is, when we want to establish FIMI practices, we must keep in mind that DIMI is equally important,” Cicurella said.

Francesca Boggeri, OSCE/ODIHR Media Monitoring Specialist, spoke about foreign interference and manipulation of information during elections.

She emphasized that, when it comes to observation missions, it is not feasible to conduct comprehensive monitoring of information on the social media and it is therefore necessary to have complementarity in the monitoring.

“We are here for a limited time, monitoring the elections before and after. That is measured in weeks, not months. That is why it is important for other institutions to get involved much earlier so that the monitoring groups can communicate,” said Boggeri.

She pointed out that the biggest risk for North Macedonia is the fragmentation in dealing with the FIMI and said that the country has the capacity at all levels as well as excellent digital experts, but what is missing is their unification.

In the search for the ideal model for an institutional response, the Government spokesperson, Marija Miteva, recalled the activities of the informal working group that is established, composed of representatives of various institutions, who work on preventing and dealing with disinformation campaigns.

“It was crucial to see how much the institutions really know what this topic means. The next step would be to institutionalize it, i.e. establish a coordinating body. There is no model that we should all follow, but rather to see the experiences of others,” said Miteva.

Joe McCarron-Shipman from the UK Government Communications Service (GCSI) presented the British RESIST model.

“What is a key rule for us is not that our role is to react to every manipulated information, to set ourselves up as arbiters of truth. We have two basic principles: first, to do no harm in this area and second, to question what is within our competence, i.e. whether we are protecting the democratic discourse,” said McCarron-Shipman.

The ICS organized this event as part of the project “Strengthening the operational readiness of the Government to respond to FIMI in North Macedonia”, supported by the British Embassy in Skopje.

As part of the activities in this project, ICS is preparing an analysis of the institutional preparedness and capacities in North Macedonia, as well as models and approaches for institutional response to various information manipulation operations.