The Institute for Communication Studies (ICS) held the fourth meeting of the Intersectoral Coordinative Group for Countering Foreign Interference and Information Manipulation (FIMI). During the meeting, potential models for a Draft Operational Protocol for Institutional Analysis, Assessment, and Response to FIMI in Macedonia were presented, alongside upcoming activities related to the operationalization of communication protocols within Macedonian institutions.

The Draft Operational Protocol and the proposed Template for Handling FIMI Incidents stem from the National Security Strategy 2024–2029. They outline several general goals and policies, including the establishment of a central government coordinative body. This body would comprise representatives from various institutions tasked with collaborating on FIMI issues and developing a future strategy.

These documents were prepared based on the current institutional setup and incorporate recommendations from EU and UK experts. The primary objective is to achieve efficient coordination in responding to threats and to prevent dissonance in the institutional response.

Based on these foundations, two models were presented:

• Model A: A model that includes security services (National Security Agency, Intelligence Agency, Intelligence and Reconnaissance Directorate).

• Model B: A communication-based model involving the public relations departments of the included institutions.

A debate ensued regarding internal mobilization within departments, specifically concerning the continuous monitoring of social media and the broader online space. Discussion also touched upon the role of the Minister’s Chief of Staff as a “coordinative filter”—the individual responsible for mobilizing the institution and ensuring that verified data from relevant sectors is provided to support the response.

Representatives from the member institutions raised several practical points:

• Monitoring Constraints: A significant obstacle to the first level of response (monitoring) is that most institutions currently have restricted access to social media platforms for various reasons.

• Hierarchy and Command: It was noted that, according to law, the State Secretary in the ministries is the one who coordinates the work of sectors and issues orders, not the Chief of Staff, even if current practice often differs.

• Risk Assessment Standards: Participants concluded that there is no established standard for risk levels (low, medium, high) and that each institution currently assesses risk in its own way.

Potential weaknesses of both models were also discussed:

• Model A (Security-inclusive): The primary weakness identified was a potential slowdown in response time. Given the nature of security agencies, information would often need to be declassified, or members of the coordinative body would be required to hold security clearances.

• Model B (Communication-based): The weakness cited was the quantitative capacity and readiness of PR department employees to handle such complex information. Some participants argued that the security channel should not be excluded, as FIMI-related data falls directly under their jurisdiction.

Furthermore, it was emphasized that the provisions of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) must be taken into account. Alignment of national legislation with the DSA is expected soon, and the Act prescribes strict methods for reacting to FIMI incidents.

The materials prepared by the Institute for Communication Studies, along with the remarks from this meeting, will be distributed to all members of the intersectoral group. The debate will continue at a conference on April 8 in Skopje, which will be attended by EU and UK experts whose recommendations are integrated into the presented operational protocols.