The media in Macedonia are the target of strategic manipulations
Countering foreign influence calls for enhanced independence, transparent funding, and the application of European regulations—not censorship.
Imagine a situation in which a fake news story, supported by manipulated videos and old photos, becomes the dominant topic in the country in just a few hours. While journalists are trying to verify the truth, social media algorithms are spreading the lie to thousands of citizens and by the evening there are already protests in front of institutions. This is not just a theoretical scenario, but everyday life in the digital media world.
The systemic weaknesses that enable such influences and the ways to build media resilience were discussed at the panel discussion “From incidents to systemic risks: external influences as a test of media resilience”, organized by the Institute of Communication Studies (ICS). The message was clear: The answer should not be sought in the introduction of censorship, but in strengthening the independence of the media and the application of European regulations.
Coordinated attacks on the media – a threat to democracy
The Macedonian media space is increasingly becoming the target of manipulation, intentional and coordinated attacks that directly impact democratic processes. These are not isolated attacks, but operations with a strategic goal – to influence public opinion, undermine trust in the media and indirectly sway electoral processes.
Experts warn that such attacks on the media should not be treated as ordinary IT incidents. Although they most often begin by hacking websites, compromising accounts or misusing digital platforms, their impact can be much broader. After the technical attack is over, a new phase often follows – spreading disinformation, manipulating content and instilling distrust among the audience. In this way, a classic cyber incident is transformed into an information operation with the potential to cause serious damage to public discourse and democratic processes.
The nature of the attacks and the reasons for this vulnerability are presented in the policy paper “The Media Ecosystem and Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference“, and the key points and recommendations of the publication, which is based on the European model of the FIMI Exposure Matrix, were presented by its authors Assoc. Prof. Marina Tuneva, PhD and Dragan Sekulovski, PhD.
Sekulovski explained that Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference are not just posts published by a politician or TV reports, but rather involve “the organized use of multiple platforms and channels with the aim, in the medium or long term, of portraying a certain government, institution or media outlet as incompetent or lacking capacity. ”
The reasons for this vulnerability are complex. Sekulovski pointed out: the non-transparent ownership of online media, the lack of “soft governance” that would focus on building resilience rather than repression, weak coordination between institutions, slow reactions to posts on social media, and incomplete implementation of European digital acts. Problems such as financial pressures and staff deficit further increase the media’s exposure to foreign influences.
The key recommendations from the analysis were presented by Marina Tuneva, emphasizing that the purpose of the proposed measures is not censorship, but rather the protection of freedom of expression and media pluralism.
She highlighted that the topic of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference has long been mentioned in fragments, but is rarely raised as a systemic issue that requires a coordinated response. According to her, the diagnosis of the problem is clear – there are legal and institutional gaps, as well as weaknesses in the media system – but a joint approach is needed to overcome them.
According to the analysis, a long-term approach is needed, based on five strategic pillars: embedding a clear definition and approach for FIMI in key national policies and strategies, strengthening the role of the public service broadcaster, increasing transparency in the media sector and among state authorities, encouraging multi-sectoral cooperation among the media, the security sector, civil society, and establishing an integrated system.
Elections – an Eden for “phantom” media
One of the most important segments of the discussion was dedicated to the way the state indirectly finances media chaos – which is most risky during elections when disinformation is spread to achieve a specific political goal.
Zoran Trajchevski, Director of the Agency for Audio and Audiovisual Media Services (AAVMS), shared data on online media outlets or portals that have “sprung up” in recent election cycles just to receive budget money. While the AAVMS Register records about 50 online media outlets, the State Election Commission has registered 240 portals during elections, which means that an additional 180 portals appear in an election cycle, established just a few days before the elections, and they disappear immediately after the elections are over. Each of them can receive up to 15,000 euros from a participant in the election process for political advertising.
Beneficiaries of budget funds also include websites registered abroad – in Kosovo, Albania, Serbia, and even Denmark – and they share no news content at all. As an example, a portal from Serbia, registered as “ gramofonski plochi.rs”, was cited, which received funds and registered with the SEC. Such a practice of allocating state money without clear and measurable criteria does not exist anywhere else in the world, Trajchevski pointed out.
He said that this funding model should be abandoned because it creates room for abuse and influence over media independence during election periods, and advocated for the establishment of a Media Fund, which would finance the production of quality content, improve working conditions, and strengthen professional capacities.
The AAVMS analysis also showed that portals refuse to register with the Media Registry in order to avoid the obligation to submit financial reports, i.e., they refuse to reveal who their donors are, Trajchevski said.
Media without protection from digital attacks
Zana Bozinovska, Editor-in-Chief of Sloboden Pecat, confirmed that the attacks on the media are not just a theory. She recounted the disaster that the editorial staff of Sloboden Pecat went through, when thousands of bots flooded the media outlet’s Instagram account in a matter of seconds. Although they asked for help, they received none from Meta or domestic institutions, meaning they were left to fend for themselves and felt desperate. As the attacks continued, they were forced to close their Instagram account, thereby losing thousands of followers and readers.
The inaction of institutions, Bozinovska emphasized, sends a bad message that digital banditry is tolerated. According to her, “the cure for such situations is a combination of professional stability, i.e. maintaining journalistic standards, technical preparedness – knowing how to identify an attack, and solidarity – the media not remaining silent when someone is the target of such attacks.”
Institutions are still building protection mechanisms
Institutions are still working on developing mechanisms for dealing with cyber-attacks. A clear algorithm is needed on where to first report an attack and how to conduct the entire procedure until it is resolved. Currently, employees in institutions are not sufficiently trained, and technical coordination and communication between authorities are lacking.
The situation is expected to improve after the adoption of additional legal acts, crucial for the functionality of the Law on Cybersecurity, which was adopted last year and entered into force in January this year. With this law, the media become part of a wider network that comprises institutions, the private sector, and experts, which will provide coordination, exchange of information, warning and support in case of cyber-attacks. Until then, the media are left on their own, with limited financial opportunities to invest in protection themselves.
The actions of the Cybersecurity Department at the Ministry of Interior are also limited – they say they can only react when it comes to a criminal act, and a bot attack, such as the case with “Sloboden Pecat”, is not covered by the Criminal Code.
While the state builds capacities to protect against cyber-attacks, the media remain unprotected, and freedom of speech becomes an easy target for foreign influences. In addition to amendments to the electoral code and the establishment of a media fund, the rapid implementation of the Law on Media Freedoms and the Law on Digital Services is crucial for financial stability, independence, and the fight against disinformation and misuse of journalists’ identities.
The panel discussion, attended by representatives from several government institutions, including members of the interdepartmental working group for dealing with FIMI, civil society organizations, representatives of foreign embassies and the media, was organised as part of the project “TRACE: Tracking, Exposing, and Countering Hidden Foreign Manipulations and Interferences”, supported by the British Embassy in Skopje.
Journalist: Sonja Petrushevska Popovska
Camera: Zoran Dogov
Video editor: Risto Dushkovski


















